Wednesday, March 21, 2012

Exegesis of "The Vienna Lecture"

           Edmund Husserl, in “The Vienna Lecture,” analyzes the difference between objectivity and subjectivity in the pursuit for knowledge. He hopes to reach those who are consumed by the task of defining a falsely objective reality, and pleads for them to reevaluate the real underlying subjectivity of their fields. Husserl is concerned with the historical path away from the spirit, ego, or self, and towards less important knowledge of the external physical world, one that people mistake to be an objective world. He claims that it is only through transcendental phenomenology that one can achieve a truly enlightened perspective of existence.
            Husserl first establishes the premise regarding philosophy’s nature as being a path to the infinite. The ideal achievements of philosophy, or that which should be sought by the philosopher, are not universal truths but are instead a path to the infinite regress of perceived truths. Husserl states, “There is the constant threat of succumbing to one-sidedness and to premature satisfaction, which take their revenge in subsequent contradictions.” This is what happens when an idea is not thoroughly fleshed out for its possible flaws, or when the initial attractiveness of an idea prevents the philosopher from adequately transcending from the initial idea to deeper concepts. The ideal philosopher must not be bogged down by the initial attractiveness of possible objective truths, but must instead seek to falsify or find doubt in the potential truths as a means of attaining a more enlightened and truly relative form of knowledge.
            The first step that a philosopher takes in his work is establishing the idea itself, the idea being a proposal based on our tools of cognition that offers a plausible explanation of something we do not know. Husserl mentions that, at first, the philosopher approaches contemplation from a one-sided and narrow minded perception. This narrow path will undoubtedly lead to seemingly wondrous ideas, but is only a partial philosophical examination and one that needs further analysis. This is explained when Husserl states, “If inadequacy announces itself through obscurities and contradictions, this motivates the beginning of a universal reflection.” This comes from his claim that no idea is wholly true or isolated from the infinite perspectives of the universe. It is essential that the philosopher address the potential fallacies of the idea in question, in an attempt at achieving what Husserl refers to as “constant reflexivity.” The constant reflexivity would then put the philosopher back on the path towards infinite and absolute knowing, or universal reflection. This path to infinite knowing is the path to realization, and realization is that which philosophy should strive to achieve.
            Husserl then contemplates the beginning of philosophy, and the perspective that the world is initially seen from, by the earliest of thinkers. At first, we are observers, simply taking in the sensual perceptions around us as we separate the physical world from ourselves, and then seek out knowledge about the nature of that physical world. The physical world at first seems objective, since we are so able to immerse ourselves within the community and within the importance of our practical lives. We are merely the observers, but we tend to forget this and take our own perceptions to be universal and objective. “The historical course of development…” as Husserl states, leads to a point in time where “…[the] first and great step of discovery is taken, namely, the overcoming of the finitude of nature already conceived as an objective in-itself, a finitude in spite of its open endlessness.” This is the transcendence from perceiving the world as finite and objective to the understanding of the “infinite ideals and infinite tasks” that make up a subjective universe.
            Expanding on this claim of subjectivity, Husserl then fleshes out the world view of the objectivist. He claims that an objective claim is an obvious one, and because of its blatant obviousness, it is also one-sided and naïve.  It is obvious because it is direct, based on observations and direct perceptions of the world around us. We see the physical world, and we feel the spiritual world, and we then proceed to evaluate the ideas of both and make causal inferences between them, inferences that we may not be wholly justified in making. Husserl concludes this paragraph by saying that the assumption that the spiritual being exists in the same space and time within nature as the physical being is the absurdity that fuels wrongful claims of objectivity.
            The power of objectivity is fueled by the power of mathematics, in that math seems to bring further order and objectivity to concepts that are not at first deemed so. The mathematician or scientist forgets that it is he doing the calculations and deductions, and thus mistakes the determinateness of mathematical probabilities and precisions to be universally objective.
This assumption, that the rationality of the individual is the unabridged and whole rationality of the universe, is what allows for seemingly objective conclusions about the spirit and the physical world to be made. By forgetting himself, the subject of the rationality, the scientist ignores the subjectivity of the rationale itself, and also the subjectivity of all subsequent claims made based on this initial relative rationale. After all, we cannot come to objective conclusions based on subjective premises. The subjectivity of the initial premises permeates itself throughout the entire argument so that any claims made can never truly transform to an objective state, even though we make think they do.
            Psychologists are amongst the worst offenders of this objective absurdity, in that they are attempting to explain the subjective soul via objective means. Scientists at least establish subjective claims and assumptions, that of which they claim to be objective, as a foundation for which to find further falsely objective truths. Scientists can ignore the subjectivity of rationality for the sake of establishing a thorough branch of knowledge that is based on their one particular rationale. The psychologist cannot do so, as the reality they are trying to study is already the subjective self, not the idea of an objective reality that the self is immersed within.  The goal of the scientist is accomplished, as they can learn extensively within the particular branch of rationale as long as he does not consider the potential subjectivity of the entire tree, starting at the roots. However, the goal of the psychologist is never truly accomplished, for they are not trying to extend knowledge from the roots of a subjective assumption, but instead trying to objectify and universalize the very subjective assumption itself, that being the identity of the soul. Beautifully, Husserl states the following, “But it is not a true psychology, any more than statistics about morals, with their no less valuable knowledge, constitute a moral science.” This analogy greatly clarifies the absurdity of trying to come to objective truths about a subjective field.
            The feigned objectivity of the sciences allows for humanity to learn a lot about the physical world around us, but we do not learn anything about our true spiritual selves. Husserl claims “Only when the spirit returns from its naïve external orientation to itself, and remains with itself and purely with itself, can it be sufficient unto itself.” This can be achieved through transcendental phenomenology, or the acceptance that the self is merely a spectator, and only one observer of a subjective reality. Husserl concludes his essay with a plea for transcendental phenomenology, claiming that Europe’s naturalism will be its demise unless a reform occurs. It is pertinent that we do not fear the idea of an infinite task, Husserl pleads, for it is the only true path to actual enlightenment. We must avoid the delusions of the physical world, and return to our spirit, where the most important and universal knowledge lies.

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